



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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

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Top Secret



25X1

Contents

West Germany: Reaction to Kohl's Trip	1
France-Chad: French Options	2
	
Sudan: Rescue of Hostages	5
PLO: Mediation Efforts Continue	5
Brazil: Increased Labor Unrest	6
	
Iraq: Execution of Opposition Clerics	8
	
Yugoslavia: Decision To Build Fighter Aircraft	9
 Special Analysis	
Japan-USSR: Restricting Access to Technology	10

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9 July 1983

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

WEST GERMANY: Reaction to Kohl's Trip

Chancellor Kohl appears to have strengthened his political position by visiting the USSR, although the reaction is split along partisan lines. [redacted]

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Conservatives are praising Kohl's determined and unambiguous approach in dealing with the Soviets. They believe it will increase Soviet respect for Kohl and make future dealings easier. [redacted]

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The opposition, on the other hand, is criticizing Kohl's failure to win any concessions from the Soviets on INF. They claim this proves the Soviets do not take Kohl seriously as an interlocutor on INF because he already has strongly endorsed the NATO position. [redacted]

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Comment: Most West Germans did not expect Soviet concessions on INF. The visit has demonstrated to the public that the Kohl government will not abandon *Ostpolitik* despite its clear support for Western security policies. Moreover, Kohl's provocative references to German reunification while in Moscow make it difficult for the opposition to accuse him of not adequately defending German interests. [redacted]

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When Foreign Minister Genscher meets with US officials in Washington on Monday, he is likely to report that Moscow showed little flexibility on INF. Genscher may highlight Soviet reactions to West German suggestions that the INF talks continue after deployments begin, and he will report on General Secretary Andropov's reaction to West German suggestions that he meet with President Reagan. Kohl would like to encourage such a meeting and be able to claim some credit for helping to arrange it. [redacted]

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
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9 July 1983

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French Combat Forces in Africa



Location	Troops	Air and Naval Components	Comment
Djibouti	4,200	Squadron of Mirage IIIC all-weather fighter aircraft, light-cargo aircraft and helicopters, naval port facility.	Largest and strategically most important of French African bases, home port for Indian Ocean squadron.
Central African Republic	1,300	4 Jaguar fighter-bombers and a KC-135 tanker on a rotating basis.	Troops largely from the 11th Airborne Division's rapid-reaction cell. Reinforced in 1980 to demonstrate resolve in opposition to Libyan invasion of Chad.
Senegal	1,200	4 Jaguar fighter-bombers and a KC-135 tanker, light-cargo aircraft and helicopters, naval port facility, 1 maritime patrol aircraft.	Base for naval patrols of Persian Gulf oil route along Africa's west coast.
Gabon	600	4 Jaguar fighter-bombers and a KC-135 tanker.	
Ivory Coast	500		

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9 July 1983

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FRANCE-CHAD: French Options

The French airlift of military supplies to Chad continues, but Paris is reluctant to commit troops to the conflict. [redacted]

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French officials stress that the military cooperation agreement with Chad obliges France to provide equipment and training but does not require direct military intervention. Deliveries so far have involved only a handful of civilian aircraft, which have delivered about 400 tons of military supplies. Key deliveries include antitank missiles and armored cars equipped with 90-mm guns. Technical advisers also have been sent to help service this equipment. [redacted]

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Comment: The French may decide to increase equipment shipments, transport equipment from N'Djamena to government outposts, provide additional technicians or military advisers, or conceivably even intervene with military forces. If the decision were made to send French units to Chad, they could be drawn from the 8,000 French troops already in Central Africa or from other "Rapid Assistance Forces" in France. French combat aircraft in Africa include eight to 12 Jaguar fighter-bombers supported by two or three refueling tankers. [redacted]

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President Mitterrand and his military and foreign policy advisers are reluctant to send troops to Chad. They presumably believe that such a move would be costly, could result in high casualties, involve France in a prolonged civil war, and eventually become a domestic political liability. They also may believe that the lack of a public appeal for France's direct intervention by Francophone African moderates is evidence that these governments would not support the dispatch of French troops to ensure President Habre's survival. [redacted]

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Mitterrand probably is anxious, however, to demonstrate his resolve to oppose Libyan pressures in the region. He might be tempted, for example, to authorize an airstrike against dissident forces in the hope that such action would save Habre from total defeat and encourage a political solution. [redacted]

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

SUDAN: Rescue of Hostages

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Comment: Government officials probably hope the refusal to pay ransom and the effective use of force will discourage similar incidents. President Nimeiri will enjoy a boost in prestige at home and abroad, and morale in the Army could improve. Security problems in the south will continue and perhaps increase, however, unless Nimeiri deals more effectively with southern grievances, including charges of neglect and exploitation by the central government and complaints about Nimeiri's recent decision to divide the south into three regions. The likelihood of further turmoil and the seizure of US citizens at Boma will make US firms increasingly nervous about the security of their personnel and operations in Sudan.

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PLO: Mediation Efforts Continue

The PLO mediation committee that returned to Damascus on Thursday is scheduled to meet tomorrow with Fatah rebels and presumably the Syrians to discuss the results of its talks with PLO and Fatah leader Arafat in Tunis. The committee chairman claims the mediators are making progress but does not indicate that Arafat is ready to compromise on the rebels' key demand for a voice in Fatah decisionmaking. The committee has succeeded, however, in getting the two sides to accept a cease-fire in Lebanon.

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Comment: If the Syrians and the rebels are dissatisfied with Arafat's response, they can resume military action. Arafat apparently believes the rebels will lose the sympathy they currently enjoy within Fatah and PLO ranks if they continue to demand peremptory access to Fatah's elected governing authority.

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BRAZIL: Increased Labor Unrest

Concern over unemployment and declining real wages has provoked workers to stage walkouts at two publicly owned oil refineries. Metalworkers in Sao Paulo have struck several foreign-owned auto plants and other industries, and some 50,000 workers have staged generally peaceful demonstrations there. The government has removed the leaders of a petroleum workers' union, fired 30 refinery employees, and put local Army units on alert. Nonetheless, other metalworkers in the city and some government bank employees have scheduled one-day work stoppages next week, and workers at a third oil refinery have voted to strike.

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Comment: Brasilia is concerned about the possibility of more widespread demonstrations against the government and about a possible shortage of petroleum products. It probably will act quickly to curtail additional walkouts, particularly in public-sector enterprises. The recent disruptions, following strikes last month by public employees, also will stiffen the resistance of government officials to tougher austerity measures being sought by the IMF.

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9 July 1983

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Top Secret

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IRAQ: Execution of Opposition Clerics

Iraq executed six Shia clerics last month, according to diplomatic sources in Baghdad. The six were relatives of the three Hakim brothers who are leaders of Dawa, the main Iraqi Shia opposition group. Following the executions, the Iraqis reportedly sent another member of the Hakim family to Tehran to warn Iraqi Shia exiles there to stop their subversive activity in Iraq. Religious leaders in Iran have condemned the killings. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The executions may have been a response to a series of bombings in Baghdad earlier this year that were directed by one of the Hakim brothers. The Shia opposition is likely to try to retaliate with new terrorist acts. The executions have further damaged the already slim prospects for peace between Iran and Iraq. [REDACTED]

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
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9 July 1983

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
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YUGOSLAVIA: Decision To Build Fighter Aircraft

The US military attache says Yugoslavia has decided to produce its own supersonic aircraft to replace its aging MIG-21s. Yugoslavia is seeking a US, British, or French license, however, to build the engine.

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Comment: The decision, which has been pending for years, ends Belgrade's negotiations for the US F-20 Tigershark and the Soviet MIG-23. Hard currency shortages killed the F-20 sale and may force Belgrade to select the cheapest, rather than the most desirable, engine for its new fighter. Yugoslavia probably hopes to offset production costs by selling the aircraft to the Third World.

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Special Analysis

JAPAN-USSR: Restricting Access to Technology

Tokyo is taking well-publicized measures to stop illegal Soviet acquisitions of technology in Japan, apparently in response to US complaints. The new actions and the publicity surrounding them are hindering Soviet collection of scientific and technical information in Japan and are forcing Japanese firms to be more cautious in exporting high technology to the USSR.

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The expulsion last week of two Soviet diplomats for industrial espionage was the latest and most visible development in Japan's increasing efforts to control technology losses to the USSR. During the past nine months, Tokyo has curtailed entrance visas for Soviet visitors, tightened travel restrictions on Soviet scientific and technical delegations, allocated additional manpower and funds for enforcement, and improved coordination among the ministries involved in technology transfer. The government also is limiting the USSR's use of its East European allies to acquire technology.

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Domestic Impact

The Foreign Ministry is the most active proponent of these precautions, overshadowing trade officials who have viewed technology exports solely in commercial terms.

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The Japanese business community now recognizes the government's commitment to control the flow of technology.

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The USSR's Response

Moscow, according to Japanese officials, has reacted "rather moderately" to the new security measures. The Soviet protest against the recent expulsions was mild in both form and substance—suggesting no reprisals unless Tokyo continues to publicize the case.



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The Soviets have continued to stress the need for improved trade, economic, and political relations, even while strongly criticizing the Japanese Government's stand on foreign policy and defense matters. They give no sign of cutting back their efforts to acquire sensitive or restricted technologies through both overt and covert means in Japan, and they are unlikely to stop trying to persuade Japanese firms to circumvent COCOM restrictions.



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Continuing Efforts

Tokyo is considering an even tighter review of high-technology exports, stricter interpretation of COCOM guidelines, more thorough customs inspections of electronics parts, and other actions. The Foreign Ministry also has promised a campaign to acquaint the business community with the effectiveness of the Soviet collection effort in Japan and its implications for national security. As part of the effort, the Ministry plans to publish a pamphlet for general distribution containing examples of technology losses of strategic importance.



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For the near term, the Trade Ministry is likely to follow the Foreign Ministry's lead.



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Ministry may soon adopt stricter procedures for exports to countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, which act as transit points for goods destined for the USSR. [REDACTED]

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The crackdown will not end the unauthorized transfer of technology to the USSR, but it will hinder Soviet collection efforts. The greater public attention being given to the problem and the increased risks of detection will tend to discourage Japanese manufacturers and trading firms engaged in illegal activity. [REDACTED]

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